Saint-Florentin english summary

On January 17, 2024 at 10:11 a.m. on the rear works base located in the Saint-Florentin-Vergigny station rights-of-way in Yonne (89), a shunting movement in pushback on an occupied dead-end track hit the two vehicles parked on track 7, despite the slowdown and then repeated stops orders by the shunting manager.
Under the effect of the kinetic energy acquired by the shunting movement, the two flat cars push the buffer and continue their derailed course to hit bungalows located perpendicular to the track and road vehicles parked nearby. The stopping of the shunting movement and the course of the 2 cars is obtained by the restraining force due to the derailment and collisions associated with the automatic application of the brakes by the break in the continuity of the general pipe.
This accident did not cause any casualties. The material toll is significant. The 2 flat cars are damaged and the "TEVO" train which suffered damage is made unavailable for the scheduled works to regenerate the rail network in Île-de-France. The end of track 7 is out of service. The bungalows of the base camp and the road vehicles are destroyed.

The immediate cause of the collision of the shunting with the two cars parked at the end of track 7 is the use by the actors of the shunting of a non-dedicated radio. Several factors have been identified as having contributed to this situation :
• the setting up of the rear bases ;
• the design of the production processes on the rear bases ;
• the implementation of the production processes on the rear bases ;
• the management of safety on the rear bases.
The absence of bodily harm, despite the extent of the damage, is explained by the excellent behavior of the head of the shunting who ordered the agents to get to safety and the absence of any agent in the base camp and in the vehicles.

An immediate recommendation was issued concerning the use of a radio that did not comply with the requirements described in the SNCF R document numbered MT 07320.

The BEA-TT issues 6 recommendations to prevent this type of accident in the following areas :
• assessment of the risks of personnel collision by rail traffic ;
• improvement of the condition of rear bases ;
• design of production processes and support processes ;
• reinforcement of briefing ;
• consolidation of operational management ;
• improvement of each operator’s internal safety control and joint control ;
• integration of safety rules into contracts and their control by safety management stakeholders
The BEA-TT issues an invitation for a situation that does not comply with the rules in the following area :
• use of an unconventional working method