Chaville english summary
On 10 November 2006, at around 10:22 am, a passenger on train 133473, comprising two carriages in a multiple-unit configuration and terminating at Versailles Rive Droite, activated the emergency alarm and jumped from the train as it passed through the station of Chaville Rive Droite at 88 km/h. The person was seriously injured upon impact with the platform.
Train 133473 was initially intended to provide a slow stopping service between Saint‑Cloud and Versailles Rive Droite, stopping at every station including Sèvres - Ville d’Avray and Chaville. This service was modified after the train’s departure, becoming a direct service from Saint‑Cloud to Versailles Rive Droite, thus removing the stops at Sèvres - Ville d’Avray and Chaville.
The driver of train 133473 was alerted to the fact that the emergency alarm had been activated and that a door had been opened while the train was moving. He stopped the train at the station of Viroflay Rive Droite to inspect his train and rearm the alarm. Later on in his journey, the driver of the following train, 133479, informed him that a person was lying lifeless on the ground at the station of Chaville Rive Droite, a short distance from the beginning of the Versailles-bound platform.
The emergency services were called to the incident and attended to the victim, who was taken to hospital by ambulance. The person died shortly after being admitted.
The direct cause of the accident was the victim’s attempt to alight from the train when it was moving. The individual in question probably panicked when they realised the train was no longer stopping at their station.
There were two indirect causal factors, relating to the design of the rolling stock and to operational management practices :
the lack of a mechanism, on the rolling stock concerned, to prevent the doors from opening when the train is moving and the alarm has been activated,
the SNCF’s cancellation of services to certain stations in the event of disrupted traffic, even after the train has departed from its station of origin.
The recommendations made subsequent to the technical investigation covered two types of measure :
study possible modifications, using rolling stock taken to the workshop for extensive maintenance work, which in the event of an Alarm Signal with Intercom (SAI) being activated would prevent the doors from being opened manually above a speed equivalent to the lowest detectable speed, and establish a programme to implement these modifications,
revise and clarify the regulations applicable to service changes, by strictly restricting the removal of regular stops, especially after the train has left its station of origin.